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Remote sensing of the earth by orbiting satellites is one of the
technological extensions of man's penetration of outer space.
Equipped with devices that sense the earth's surface in different frequency ranges, including spectral bands not visible to the human
eye,' these satellites are able to obtain data about the earth's environment, the nature and conditions of natural resources, and other
natural and man-made features and phenomena. Remote sensing
is particularly well-suited for identifying and locating natural resources around the world.2 The identification and development of
natural resources are of vital concern to all the world's peoples.
Currently, the world's population is expanding while the relative
supply of foodstuffs and raw materials is dwindling. As this trend
continues, scarcity of basic necessities will become a pressing
human problem. In the quest to combat this scarcity, remote sensing can become an important tool to improve living conditions and
economic and social development everywhere.
There are, however, important international legal and political
considerations which surround the technique of remote sensing.
Questions of national sovereignty and other issues of international
law must be settled before remote sensing data can be optimally
used.
The Legal Sub-Committee of the United Nations Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) has recently considered the adoption of legal principles regarding remote sensing.
* Professor of Political Science, University of West Florida.
1. Mossinghoff & Fuqua, UnitedNations Principleson Remote Sensing- Report on Developments, 1970-1980, 8 J. SPACE L. 103, 103 (1980).
2. Natural resources are defined generally as "animal, plant and mineral assets and
artifacts that can be put to human use," such as "air, soil, water, metallic deposits, petroleum
products, fish and animals." Brooks, Technologicaland LegalAspects of EnvironmentalMonitoring, I J. SPACE L. 6, 6 (1973).
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By 1980, the Soviet Union,3 Argentina,4 Brazil,5 and France,6
France and the Soviet Union jointly,7 and Argentina and Brazil
jointly (cosponsored by Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela, 8 and the
United States9 ) had submitted draft legal principles for the Committee's consideration. Mexico submitted the most recent draft on
March 19, 1981. The Mexican draft entitled, "Principles Relating
to Remote Sensing of the Earth, Its Natural Resources and Its Environment,"'" contains seventeen principles. The Mexican principles not only address the substantive content of the consolidated
"Draft Principles" which have been under consideration since
1979,"1 but also offer substantial modifications and new considerations. The Mexican submission "will be treated as an important
contribution, since it was the most comprehensive effort to modify
the essentially unchanged subcommittee drafts from 1979 through
12
198 1.11
Although the legal and political aspects of remote sensing and
national sovereignty over natural resources are thoroughly intertwined, they may, for analysis purposes, be considered separately.
The literature which deals with the legal arguments on remote sensing is ample.' 3 Emphasis, therefore, is on principal legal issues in
3. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), Progress Report of the
Working Group on Remote Sensing of the Earth by Satellites on the Work of its Second
Session, at 11-12, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/I11 (1973).
4. COPUOS, Report of the Legal Sub-Committee on the Work of its Thirteenth Session, at 1-3, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/133 (1974).
5. Id. at 3-5.
6. Id. at 5-6.
7. Id. at 9-10.
8. COPUOS, International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, (Agenda
Item 32), U.N. Doc. A/C.1/1047 (1974).
9. COPUOS, Legal Implications of Remote Sensing of the Earth From Space,
(Agenda Item 4), U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2.L.103 (1975).
10. COPUOS, Report of the Legal Sub-Committee on the Work of its Twentieth Session, at 13-16, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/288 (1981).
11. Id. at 7-12.
12. C. CHRISTOL, THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE 754 (1982).

For an excellent comparison between the Mexican submission and the consolidated "Draft
Principles", see id. at 749-54.
13. For a variety of legal viewpoints on the issue of remote sensing and national sovereignty over natural resources, see Christol, The Casefor a Possible IntegratedNorth-American
Landsat Program, in LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF REMOTE SENSING FROM OUTER SPACE 131

(N. Matte & H. DeSaussure eds. 1976); Cocca, Remote Sensing of Natural Resources by
Means ofSpace Technology: A Latin American Viewpoint, in LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF REMOTE SENSING FROM OUTER SPACE 75 (N. Matte & H. DeSaussure eds. 1976); Galloway,

Remote Sensingfrom Outer Space: Legal Implicationsof Worldwide Utilizationand Dissemination of Data, in LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF REMOTE SENSING FROM OUTER SPACE 91 (N.

Matte & H. DeSaussure eds. 1976); Gorove, Legal and Economic Implications of Remote
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the context of the Mexican submission. Political considerations are
also of great significance. The position taken by a state varies depending upon its present economic status, its particular economic
and political history, and whether it is a sensing or a sensed state.
I.

A.

LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

The Concept of Sovereignty and Remote Sensing

Sovereignty is a concept of international relations which traditionally has caused considerable intellectual and political confusion. It cannot be defined in -,nenifir.legn! tprm nltlk.gh t.
refer to it in that light. This is especially true when states seek to
justify actions or political stances which may be of questionable
legality.
Sovereignty is best understood as "a permanent rule organized
on the basis of legal principles and exercised over a specific territory, characterized outwardly by a certain degree of effective independence and inwardly by effective rule."' 4 It has become the
cornerstone of the modern international system, where power and
authority remain consciously divided and decentralized.
National sovereignty is the principle which is often cited to
Sensingfrom Outer Space--Focus on Latin America, in LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF REMOTE
75 (N. Matte & H. DeSaussure eds. 1976); Leigh, UnitedStates
Policy of Collecting and Disseminating Remote Sensing Data, in LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF
REMOTE SENSING FROM OUTER SPACE 147 (N. Matte & H. DeSaussure eds. 1976); Robinson, Fora Worldwide Utilization and Disseminationof Data Acquired Through Remote Sensing, in LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF REMOTE SENSING FROM OUTER SPACE 113 (N. Matte & H.
DeSaussure eds. 1976); Zhukov, Problemsof Legal Regulation of Using Information Concerning Remote Sensing of the Earthfrom Space, in LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF REMOTE SENSING
FROM OUTER SPACE 125 (N. Matte & H. DeSaussure eds. 1976); Cocca, Legal Problems
Relating to the Evaluation, Conservation and Development of Earth Resources by Means of
Space Objects, 14 PROC. COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE 99 (1971); Dauses, NationalSovereignty andRemote Sensing of Earth Resourcesby Satellites, 16 PROC. COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER
SPACE 121 (1973); de Graaf & Rejnen, Data Protection in the Technique of Remote Sensing by
Satellites 22 PROC. COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE 187 (1979); DeSaussure, Remote Sensing
by Satellites. What Futureforan InternationalfRegime?,71 AM. J. INT'L L. 707 (1977); Galloway, IntroductoryReport, 16 PROC. COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE 90 (1973); Gorove, Earth
Resources Survey Satellites and the Outer Space Treaty, I J. SPACE L. 80 (1973); Kosuge,
Remote Sensing and InternationalLaw, 20 PROC. COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE 316 (1977);
Magdelenat, The Major Issues in the "'Agreed"Principleson Remote Sensing, 9 J. SPACE L.
111 (1981); Matte, Remote Sensing by Satellites andAerospace Law, 19 PROC. COLLOQUIUM
L. OUTER SPACE 325 (1976); Polter, Remote Sensing and State Sovereignty, 4 J. SPACE L. 99
(1976); Stoebner, Remote Sensing of Earth Resources. Technique and Law, 19 PROC. COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE 33 (1976); Stowe, The Development of InternationalLaw Relating to
Remote Sensing of the Earthfrom Outer Space, 10 PROC. COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE 92
(1976).
14. Polter, Remote Sensing and State Sovereignty, 4 J. SPACE L. 99, 111-12 (1976).
SENSING FROM OUTER SPACE
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support positions taken by states on the issue of remote sensing of
natural resources. To justify reference to sovereignty, however, the
concept must be viewed in terms of both rights over a specific territory and independence sufficient to withstand pressures from other
states which claim similar rights and independence. When interests
of states overlap, the national sovereignty of one or more of the
states must be compromised. Sovereignty, therefore, is never absolute. The intervening consideration is power.
To assert a sovereign right, states may rely upon a right
founded on some legal theory, but it must be backed by political
power. Sovereignty based upon theoretical right is greatly diminished when compared to sovereignty based upon the power to control. Some states seem to be "more sovereign" than others. It must
be stressed, therefore, that sovereignty, especially as it relates to territorial sovereignty, is a relative concept. 15
In regard to remote sensing, the sovereignty of the sensing
state to engage in sensing activities confronts the sovereignty of the
sensed state over its natural resources, including information pertaining to them. Although remote sensing takes place in outer
space where there is no sovereignty, the data are collected for potential use on earth, where state sovereignty prevails over territory
and airspace.
Legal positions on remote sensing vary according to the nationality of the sensing state and the territory being sensed. Remote
sensing by a state of its own territory or of the high seas does not
present a legal problem. When an aircraft "using sensing equipment flies outside the territorial waters of the sensed state, and not
in the sovereign airspace of a foreign state, it has been generally
accepted that such activity, and the subsequent dissemination of
what has been acquired, is lawful."' 6 Following this reasoning,
some states argue that it is likewise lawful to engage in remote sensing from sovereign-free outer space. These states emphasize that
sensing "is a space event rather than an earth event and that restrictions resulting from the principle of territorial sovereignty have no
application."' 7 States holding the opposing view believe remote
sensing violates national territorial sovereignty. They stress the
15. Robinson, For a World Wide Utilization and Dissemination of Data Acquired
Through Remote Sensing, in LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF REMOTE SENSING FROM OUTER
SPACE 113, 114-15 (N. Matte & H. DeSaussure eds. 1976); See Polter, supra note 14, at 113-

18 for an excellent discussion of the "factual" as opposed to the "legal" status of sovereignty.
16. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 12, at 731.
17. Id. at 732.
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earth impact of sensing and the right to exercise their sovereignty to
protect earth-based resources and activities. Some states, while
generally accepting the legality of remote sensing, desire the right
to refuse sensing of their territories without their prior approval or
prior notification by the sensing state. Finally, there are some states
which accept the general legality of remote sensing but want to restrict dissemination of sensed data.I8 Those states which oppose remote sensing from outer space or have the desire to impose
restrictions on sensing believe that specific knowledge of the
amount, quality and location of natural resources "is a private and
9

considerations."'
It is within this general context that the specific legal issues
discussed below and the relevant principles of the Mexican submission on remote sensing of the earth to the Legal Sub-Committee of
COPUOS must be considered.
B. Specific Legal Issues
The specific legal issues emerging from the conflict between
remote sensing and national sovereignty over natural resources are
contained in the following questions:
(1) Is remote sensing of the earth from outer space permissible
under international law?
(2) Is it necessary for a sensed state to give prior approval
before remote sensing can take place?
(3) May remotely sensed information be disseminated to third
parties, and, if so, are there any conditions attaching thereto?
The first issue has been settled for some time, although some
questions were raised initially. Legal opposition to remote sensing
of natural resources centered around interpretation of the 1967
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies (1967 Outer Space Treaty). 20 Some states suggested that remote sensing of natural resources constituted a space
activity fundamentally different from those envisaged by the 1967
Outer Space Treaty.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 733.
20. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S.
6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967 Outer Space Treaty].
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States supported the nonapplicability of the Treaty by arguing
that remote sensing was "earth-looking" rather than "outwardlooking." Others pointed out, however, that there was no basis in
the negotiating history of that Treaty to support the distinction,
"and insofar as there is any evidence of the drafters' intentions it
leans quite in the other direction."'" The primary interest in space
activity, in other words, was in the use of space technology to improve conditions on earth. The drafters recognized that mankind
had a common interest in the potential use of outer space, "and the
strong motivation for the Treaty was that all peoples should benefit." 2 2 Exploration of outer space and celestial bodies was to be
only one of the opportunities available to all states. Earth-looking,
data-collecting satellites "were planned from the very beginning of
the space age for a variety of purposes, each intended to apply analyzed data, wherever applicable, to earthly problems."23
Years before the negotiation of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty,
the United States was engaged in numerous, well-publicized studies
of the earth's weather from space by meteorological satellites,
which, by definition, were oriented toward the earth. Numerous
photographs of the earth and its resources were taken by the early
United States manned space flights in the Mercury and Gemini
programs. Further, "planning for continuation of these activities in
the Apollo program was well-known at the time the treaty was
agreed." 2 4 These programs have never been questioned.
Reconnaissance satellites had also been in use prior to the 1967
Outer Space Treaty. Although they are strategic and serve political-military purposes, no serious legal objections have prevented
states with such satellite capability from using it. States without
such technology realize that any pleas to prohibit their use would
go unheeded. Although it is understood that other states may be
benefitted, states possessing the technology have generally been unwilling to forego satellite information. International law does apply strict rules to govern airspace above the land and territorial sea
of states, but it is agreed that similar rules do not apply to outer
space, notwithstanding the fact that specific delineation of airspace
21. Statement by U.S. Representative Leonard Jaffe before the Working Group on Remote Sensing of the Legal Sub-Committee of COPUOS (Feb. 25, 1974), reprinted in 70
DEP'T ST. BULL. 376 (1974).
22. Galloway, supra note 13, at 96.
23. Id.
24. See Jaffe, supra note 21.
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and outer space has not yet been made.2 5
Certain provisions of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty in particular support the legality of remote sensing of natural resources. Article I, paragraphs 2 and 3 state that outer space "shall be free for
exploration and use by all states without discrimination of any
kind, on the basis of equality and in accordance with international
law, and . . . there shall be freedom of scientific investigation in

outer space." Despite the fact that the earth, under the nomenclature of the Agreement, cannot be regarded as a celestial body in
outer space, the freedom-of-outer-space rule strongly suggests the
Article III permits states to "carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, in accordance with international law,
including the Charter of the United Nations." By implication, this
provision applies to remote sensing since nothing in international
law "could specifically be invoked as a prohibition of the type of
activities performed by satellites surveying earth resources. '"26

Fi-

nally, Article XI acknowledges the right of states to the "peaceful
exploration and use of outer space." This acknowledgment impliedly suggests the existence of a right to engage in remote
sensing. 21
Because remote sensing and other peaceful outer space activities have been taking place for longer than a decade, it can be argued that a permissive rule of customary international law has been
established. Attempts, since the early 1970's, by states to devise
rules for remote sensing of natural resources and the environment
25. Some states have also suggested that remote sensing of natural resources is distinguishable from remote sensing by meteorological and reconaissance satellites because it allegedly affects the earth in a different and more significant way. This argument also did not
withstand serious scrutiny. It was noted that sensing the earth's environment "for resources,
mapping contours, air and water pollution, land use, or any other purpose does not of itself
affect the Earth any more than a meteorological satellite changes or affects the cloud formations it senses." Statement by U.S. Representative Ronald F. Stowe before the Legal SubCommittee of COPUOS, (Feb. 19, 1975), reprintedin 72 DEP'T ST. BULL. 421 (1975).

26. Gorove, InternationalLegal Aspects of Earth Resources Satellites, 15 PROC. COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE 30, 31 (1972).

27. For legal support of the notion that the 1967 Outer Space Treaty permits remote
sensing of natural resources, see Brital, Survey from Space of Earth Resources, 13 PROC.
COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE 197 (1970); Christol, Space Sensing ofHarms to the Marine
Environment-Damagesin InternationalLaw, 16 PROC. COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE 106,
110 (1973); Dauses, supra note 13, at 127-28; DeSaussure, Remote Sensing by Satelites: What
Futureforan InternationalRegime?, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 710 (1977); Fiorio, InternationalImplications of Earth Resources Surveys by Satelites, J. SPACE L. 1,1-2 (1973); Gorove, Earth
Resource Satellites andthe Outer Space Treaty, 15 PROC. COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE 80

(1972); Polter, supra note 14, at 107-08.
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evidence their acceptance of these activities. The consolidated
"Draft Principles" now being considered by the Legal Sub-Committee of COPUOS neither prohibits nor specifically acknowledges
the right of states to engage in remote sensing of others. This is also
true of the 1981 Mexican prinicples. Both drafts, however, "by
seeking to impose specific limitations on such sensing" recognize
"the wider right to engage in sensing. "28
The legal considerations regarding prior approval for remote
sensing of particular states are similar to those discussed above.
There is no rule of international law, including the 1967 Outer
Space Treaty, which proscribes remote sensing without prior consent. Articles I, III, and XI may also be cited in support of this
position. As long as one state remotely senses the resources of another in accordance with these principles, the principles of the
United Nations Charter, and generally accepted principles of international law which relate to space activities, no legal basis for a
requirement of prior approval exists. A prior consent rule would
also be objectionable for technical reasons. Presently, remote-sensing satellites scan a wide area which includes the territories of several states. Despite scientific sophistication, satellites are not able
to discern invisible international borders or disentangle images according to boundary lines. The technology required to devise and
operate a system "to separate billions of bits of data along political
boundary lines would be financially prohibitive. 2 9 In addition, the
studies which remote-sensing satellites undertake are either regional or global. These satellites can and do study ecological systems, vegetation and soil patterns, pollution, and rift systems in
ttLt
presen
., 0n st te of,..
addi;
t
to naturtal
..
resources. Conditions
affect conditions in others.30 If prior approval were to become a
legal requirement, denial by individual states could effectively prevent remote sensing, thereby restricting access to significant information beneficial to all states.
Of the draft principles submitted to the Legal Sub-Committee
of COPUOS, only those submitted by Brazil 3 1 and those submitted
jointly by Argentina and Brazil 32 specifically require prior consent.
28. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 12, at 753.
29. Leigh, supra note 13, at 149.
30. Id.
31. COPUOS, supra note 4, Proposal 3, Annex 4, at 3-5.
32. International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Report of the First
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Twenty-Ninth Session (Agenda Item 32),
art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/1047 (1974).
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Principle 12 of the 1981 Mexican submission instead requires that
sensing states "shall give advance notfication to the state whose territories, territorial sea or maritime areas under their jurisdiction
will be sensed."3 3 Further, Principle 13 requires a sensing state,
''upon request of the sensed state," to "consult" with the sensed
state. Such a requirement is necessary "in order to comply with
Principle 14 and thus to promote international cooperation . . .
among states and to enhance the mutual benefits to be derived from
this activity." Principle 15 also requires that sensed states be provided with "preliminary information. . . relating to the natural reaUUL u UIf We territory. Obviously, Mexico has backed away trom
the prior approval requirement, which was contained in its previous cosponsored joint proposal.
The principles cited above represent attempts to circumscribe
sensing states' freedom of action to as great an extent as is politically feasible. Mexico's attitude represents an acceptance of the
political reality that sensing states are unlikely to comply with any
requirement that would seriously impede remote sensing activities.
of the
This attitude is also apparent in Mexico's acknowledgment
34
technical difficulties that prior consent would create.
The third legal issue, dissemination of natural resource information obtained through remote sensing, is the most difficult to resolve. The question of the control a sensed state has over natural
resource information from within its territory is politically sensitive. States which support open dissemination of remotely sensed
data employ arguments similar to those proffered in opposition of
the prior approval requirement. They contend that (1) the technology of remote sensing is not able to detect political boundaries, (2)
the success of remote sensing requires large-area data collection,
33. COPOUS, supra note 10, Principle 12 (emphasis added). The draft principles suggested by France contain a provision for advance notification similar to the Mexican Principle 12. See COPOUS, supra note 4, Principle 3, at 5-6.
34. A strong case can be made for the deletion of Principle 12 from the Mexican submission since Principle 7,paragraph 2 accomplishes a similar purpose. The latter requires
that sensing states "shall, prior to the execution of these programmes, give prior notification
thereof to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall publish such notification."
This statement should be sufficient to quiet the concerns of Mexico and other states with
similar views, since it accords to them the respect of their national sovereignty they seek and
affords them an opportunity to participate and cooperate with the sensing state. In 1981 the
Working Group of the Legal Sub-Committee of COPUOS deleted the prior notification sentence from Principle 8 of the consolidated "Draft Principles" for these reasons. Report of the
Chairmanof the Working Group on Remote Sensing, 9 J. SPACE L. 121, 123-24 (1981), taken
from COPUOS, Report of the Legal Sub-Committee on the Work of its Twentieth Session,
Annex 1,at 1-6, U.N. Doc. A/AC 105/288 (1981).
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and (3) certain provisions of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty may be
interpreted as to include remote sensing activities.
Article I, paragraph 3 of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty refers to
"freedom of scientific investigation" and requires that states "shall
facilitate and encourage international cooperation in such investigation." This provision clearly suggests that cooperatively acquired
data be broadly disseminated because it would be, as paragraph 1
of the same article states, "for the benefit and in the interests of all
countries." Article III may be cited to support the requirement that
states pursue their outer space activities "in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation and understanding." The open dissemination of
remotely sensed data would seem to promote such cooperation and
understanding among states.
It is Article XI, however, which is especially pertinent to the
argument supporting open dissemination. It reads:
In order to promote international cooperation in the peaceful exploration and the use of outer space, states. . . conducting activities in outer space, .. agree to inform the Secretary-Generalof
the United Nations as well as the Public and the internationalscientific community, to the greatest extent feasible andpracticable,
of the nature, conduct, locations and results of such activities.
On receiving the said information, the Secretary-General of the
United Nations should be prepared to disseminate it immediately
and effectively.35
The wording of this provision seems clear. It does not legally
impose a duty upon states to disclose detailed information, "but
leaves it to thei
..
disc.sreetion to dtr
,.r
n
accordance wirth. the
guiding principle of world-wide cooperation and having due regard
to the betterment of mankind, to what extent data communications
is (technically) feasible and (politically) practicable." 3 6
Reference may also be made to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights3 7 and the International Covenant on Eco35. 1967 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 20, art. XI (emphasis added).
36. Dauses, supra note 13, at 131. Interestingly, Gorove suggests that it could be argued
that the admitted purpose of Article XI is "to promote international cooperation in the
peaceful exploration and use of outer space," and that "if the dissemination would not promote such purpose because a number of states were objecting to it, then the obligation imposed by Article XI would not be applicable. This, of course, would in no way imply any
restriction on the party to disseminate the information." Gorove, supra note 26, at 31.
37. G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Covenant on Political Rights].
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nomic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 38 both of which came into force
in 1976 and currently are legally binding on over sixty states. 39 Article 19, paragraph 2 of the former reads: "Everyone shall have the
right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless offrontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, . . through
any . . media of his choice."' 40
Article 11, paragraph 2(a) of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, in pertinent part, states:
States . . . recognizing the fundamental right of everyone to be
tree trom hunger, shall take, individually and through international cooperation, the measures . . . which are needed: To improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of
food by making full use of technical and scientic knowledge, by
disseminating knowledge of the principles of nutrition and by de-

veloping or reforming agrarian systems in such a way as to
achieve the most efficient development and utilization of natural
resources. 41

Article 15, paragraph l(b) of the same Covenant requires
states to "recognize the right of everyone: To enjoy the benefits of
scientific progress and its applications."42
The above provisions suggest that individuals have the right to
receive and disseminate information gained through remote sensing. This right "corresponds with the regulations of Article XI of
the Outer Space Treaty, according to which states are obliged to
43
make the information available to the individual.
38. G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Covenant on Cultural Rights].
39. For the full texts of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, see N. LEECH, C. OLIVER
& J. SWEENEY, DOCUMENTARY SUPPLEMENT TO CASES AND MATERIALS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 46-62, 67-76 (1973). The Covenants incorporate provisions of Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948). The
full text of the Resolution is in N. LEECH, C. OLIVER & J. SWEENEY, supra at 40-45.
40. Covenant on Political Rights, supra note 37, art. 19, para. 2 (emphasis added).
41. Covenant on Cultural Rights, supra note 38, art. 11, para. 2(a).
42. Covenant on Cultural Rights, supra note 38, art. 15, para. l(b).
43. Polter, supra note 13, at 110. Article 19, paragraph 2 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and Article 11, paragraph 2(a) and Article 15, paragraph 1(b) of
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights apply to individuals
rather than to states. As such, they underscore the practical difficulty inherent in any attempt
to restrict open dissemination of remotely sensed data. The United States is presently the
leading sensing state, and under its municipal law, the government "would have no basis on
which to deny remote sensing data to U.S. citizens." Under any arrangement regarding dissemination, therefore, some information released to citizens of the United States "would find
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States opposing open dissemination stress that national sovereignty over natural resources extends to information about those
resources. Specific concern about sovereign control of natural resources has resulted in a number of General Assembly resolutions.
However, many of these resolutions were put into effect prior to the
advent of the space age." In essence, each of the resolutions has
assured states the right of permanent sovereignty over their natural
resources and wealth. However, General Assembly resolutions, because of their recommendatory nature, do not normally create international law; they express the opinions of a majority of states on
given issues. This was equally true of the resolutions on national
sovereignty over natural resources. Their principal legal impact
was to affirm an inherent characteristic of sovereign states.
The legal interpretation of this inherent characteristic and its
application to the principle of freedom of information about natural resources has produced differences of opinion on this issue. It
has been argued, for example, that the principle of freedom of information across national frontiers is essentially a political concept.
Even though the free flow of information may be legally applicable,
as in the cases of the International Covenants on Civil and Political
Rights and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, it likely could
its way abroad in an irregular and uncontrollable manner." The result would be that such
data "would become available to different countries on an unequal basis," with some perhaps obtaining none at all. Jaffe, supra note 21, at 377.
Article 19, paragraph 2 might also be considered, however, in connection with Article 47
of the same Covenant, which states that nothing in the Covenant "shall be interpreted as
impairing the inherent right of all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural
interpretation and emphasis, the latter article might
resources and wealth." Depending ..
have a restrictive effect on the freedom of information provisions of the former.
44. G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974);
G.A. Res. 3234, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 14, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974); G.A. Res.
3201-02, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at 3, 5, U.N. Doc. A/9556 (1974); G.A. Res. 3171, 28
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973); G.A. Res. 3016, 27 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 48, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972); G.A. Res. 2778, 26 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 29) at 28, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971); G.A. Res. 2776, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
29) at 23, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971); G.A. Res. 2733, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 19,
U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); G.A. Res. 2692, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 63, U.N. Doc.
A/8028 (1970); G.A. Res. 2601, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 12-13, U.N. Doc. A/7630
(1969); G.A. Res. 2600, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 11, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969); G.A.
Res. 2386, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 24, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968); G.A. Res. 2158,
21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 29, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962); G.A. Res. 1720, 16 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 17) at 25, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961); G.A. Res. 1515, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
16) at 9, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960); G.A. Res. 1314, 13 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 27,
U.N. Doc. A/4090 (1958); G.A. Res. 626, 7 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 18, U.N. Doc. A/
2361 (1952); G.A. Res. 523, 6 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 20, U.N. Doc. A/2119 (1952).
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not withstand a confrontation with the principle of national sovereignty. The primary reason that open dissemination would not
withstand such a challenge is grounded in the fact that national
sovereignty is the keystone of international legal relations and, as
such, would be accorded supremacy. 45 In addition, since the actual
transfer of remotely sensed information on natural resources would
involve the economic and political security of the states concerned,
states exercise of sovereignty clearly embodies the right to control
dissemination of the information so obtained.4 6 Principle 15 of the
1981 Mexican submission conforms to this view. It requires the
p~iu appiovai uf a sensed state before --information or resuits and

conclusions" about its natural resources can be disseminated to
third parties and thus follows the general line of the consolidated
"Draft Principles" and several of the previous state proposals.4 7
The position of opposing states on the open dissemination issue appear to be unyielding. The concern of Mexico and others is
that information acquired by remote-sensing satellites might be
used to the economic and political disadvantage of the sensed state.
This fear is grounded in both the international political relations of
states and in specific historical experiences. The better legal view,
however, is in support of open dissemination. It is unlikely that the
United Nations General Assembly resolutions previously mentioned were ever meant to include remotely sensed information regarding natural resources. Also, knowledge about natural
resources alone cannot be equated with any reduction in the legal
right any sovereign state has over such resources. Nor does knowledge of natural resources by other states create access to them; consent of the sovereign state would still be required. Any attempt to
limit dissemination of information, therefore, should be considered,
at the least, as an attempt to reinterpret the traditional legal under45. Statement of Mr. Vallarta, representative of Mexico before the Legal Sub-Committee of COPUOS, in Summary Record of the Two Hundred and Eighteenth Meeting-The
Various Implications of Space Communications: Report of the Working Group of Direct
Broadcast Satellites, (Agenda Item 4) at 66, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.218 (1974).
46. Statement of Mr. de Seixas Correa, representative of Brazil, before the Legal SubCommittee of COPUOS, in Summary Record of the Two Hundred and Twentieth Meeting-Matters Relating to the Activities Carried Out Through Remote Sensing Satellite
Surveys of Earth Resources, (Agenda Item S) at 87, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.220,
(1974).
47. See COPOUS, "Draft Principles": Principle 15, supra note 10 at 7-12; Soviet
Union: Proposal 5, supra note 3, at 11-12; France: Proposal 5, Id., at 5-6; France and the
Soviet Union jointly: Proposal 5(b), Id., at 9-10; Argentina and Brazil jointly, cosponsored
by Chile, Mexico and Venezuela: Article IX, U.N. Doc. A/C.I/1047 (1974).
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standing of sovereignty and, at the most, as a movement to create a
new rule of international law.48
II.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

International law is a reflection of international politics. When
states attempt to devise new rules of international law, their negotiating positions are based upon perceived national interests. Each
state has some interests in common with others; yet, for a number
of reasons, including geographical location, amount of natural resources, and historical experiences, each state and its political motivations are unique. The 1981 Mexican proposals on remote sensing
must be considered in this light. Mexico was guided largely by its
condition as an advanced developing country and by its intense
feelings of nationalism. Mexico has aligned itself with other developing states on international economic and political issues and has
attempted in recent years to provide Third World leadership. What
follows is a discussion of the policy considerations which underlie
the Mexican submission on remote sensing.
A.

Mexico and the Third World

The Third World comprises the poorer, less developed countries of the world. Although there are over 140 countries in this
category, aggregately accounting for seventy-five percent of the
world's population, they represent roughly only twenty percent of
goods and services produced, as measured against the world's gross
national product. 4 9 However, within the Third World, there are
wide discrepancies among the individual nations in economic development and industrialization.
Mexico belongs to a small but important group of developing
states referred to as the New Industrial Countries (NICs). These
NICs have achieved an increase in their gross national products as
a result of the rapid growth in production and exportation of manufactured goods. As a group, they have expanded their economies
more rapidly than their populations have increased. This is essen48. The United States has already made numerous bilateral agreements to build ground
stations for the acquisition and processing of data from remote sensing satellites. These stations are receiving remotely sensed data on the natural resources of states other than those in
which they are located. To be effective, therefore, a new law which would limit dissemination of information might require abrogation of existing legal agreements and assumption of
control or the dismantling of present ground stations outside the sensing state.
49. C. KEGLEY & E. WITTKOPF, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: TREND AND TRANSFORMATION 73 (1981).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol14/iss1/3

14

Myers: Remote Sensing and National Sovereignty Over Natural Resources: A
Vol. 14

CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

tial for developing countries which are seeking to advance economically and to improve their standard of living." Interestingly, the
economic advances by NICs have been accomplished largely
through increased interaction with and ties to richer industrialized
states.'
The historic relationships between the rich and the poor, however, have come under increasing attack from the Third World. To
developing countries, the present international political economy
seems structured to perpetuate their inferior status. There is widespread feeling that present international economic institutions, such
as the International Monetary Fund and the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, are very biased against Third World states in
their global distribution of income and influence. This perception
is butressed by a legacy of colonial exploitation and continuing
levels of poverty unheard of in industrialized states. Because of
these feelings, developing countries have promoted the creation of
new institutions and supported a restructuring of the old. 2
The striving for equality has its political dimension as well.
Third World countries are disturbed by the present system in which
a few wealthy, industrial and more powerful states make most of
the important decisions that affect all others. They believe each
state should be able to manage its own political and economic affairs "without interference from the outside." They argue that each
state should be able to decide for itself "how its resources should be
utilized" and "what policies industrial and agricultural enterprises
50. Id. at 77-78.
51. For an excellent discussion of the NIC's ties to the developed world, see Krasner,
TransformingInternationalRegimes. What the Third World Wants and Why, 25 INT'L STUD.
Q. 2, 136-45 (1981).
52.

C. KEGLEY & E. WTTKOPF, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: PATTERN AND PROCESS

203-04 (1982). Dependency theory is a term used by scholars from the Third World, especially in Latin America, to characterize the economic and political relationships between
developing and developed states. For a general discussion of dependency theory see J. RAY,
GLOBAL POLITICS 224-29 (2d ed. 1983). For more detail see Dos Santos, The Structure of
Dependence, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 231, 231-36 (1970); Bath & James, Dependency Analysis of
Latin America. Some Criticisms, Some Suggestions, I1 LATIN AM. RESEARCH REV. 1, 3-54
(1976); Caporaso, Dependence, Dependency, and Power in the Global System, 32 INT'L ORG.
13, 13-43 (1978); Caporaso, Dependency Theory. Continuities and Discontinuitiesin Development Studies, 34 INT'L ORG. 605, 605-28 (1980); See also Smith, The Logic of Dependence
Theory Revisited, 35 INT'L ORG. 755, 755-61 (1981); Smith, The Underdevelopment of Development Literature-The Case of Dependency Theory, 31 WORLD POLITICS 247-88 (1979). See
generally F.

CARDOZO

&

E.

FALETTO,

DEPENDENCY

AND

DEVELOPMENT

IN

LATIN

AMERICA (1978); Duvall, A FormalModel of "Dependencia'Theory. Structure and Measurement, in FROM NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT TO GLOBAL COMMUNITY (R. Merritt & M. Russet
eds. 1981).
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operating within its borders should follow." 53
The views of Third World states went largely unexpressed in
international forums until 1962, when these states were able to use
their majority position in the UN General Assembly to call for a
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) 5 4 The Conference convened in the spring of 1964 at
Geneva. Items of economic concern and related international
political issues were on the agenda. At this meeting, the Group of
77 was formed as a coalition of developing countries committed to
pressing industrialized states for economic concessions. Now numbering over 120 members, the Group of 77 has become the most
vocal advocate of Third World interests in various international
gatherings.55
Before 1971, Mexico had assumed a low profile on economic
issues that separated the rich and the poor. Mexico's transition to a
more politicized and aggressive stance can be attributed to a fusion
of economic and political motives that grew out of developments
peculiar to Mexico in 1971. Continuing frustration with domestic
reform efforts led to greater emphasis on foreign policy intitiatives.
The August 1971 surcharge tax by the United States on imported
Mexican goods, however, was a significant external factor that contributed directly to this transition. After failing to persuade its major trading ally to waive the tax, President Luis Echeverria went to
the UN General Assembly, and for the first time, Mexico presented
its economic grievances in an international forum. President
53. Wriggins, Third World Strategiesfor Change. The Poieal Context of North-South
Interdependence, in REDUCING GLOBAL INEQUALITIES 39 (G. Karlsson & W. Wriggins eds.
1978).
54. G.A. Res. 1785, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 14, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962).
The resolution was adopted by a vote of 91 to 0, with one abstention. Despite the near
unanimous support, however, there was a general lack of enthusiasm among the developed
states in part because of concern over the agenda. After being assured that international
economic institutions and East-West trade would not be discussed, the industrialized states
agreed. Later, through step-by-step negotiating maneuvers, these items were returned to the
agenda, but by that time the developed countries were committed. B. GosovIc, UNCTAD:
CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE 19-20 (1972).
55. Although UNCTAD has been the most significant meeting place for economic and
political dialogue between developed and developing states, the latter have also presented
their case in other international forums, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World
Bank, the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference and the ad hoc Conference on
International Economic Cooperation, which met in Paris for 18 months between late 1975
and mid-1977. The most comprehensive treatment of the background, creation, and work of
UNCTAD is B. Gosovic, supra note 48, at 271-303. This chapter deals specifically with the
Group of 77. The most recent, comprehensive treatment of the Group of 77 is The Group of
77: Evolution, Structure, Organization (Oceana 1981).
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Echeverria appealed for Third World solidarity and public censure
of the United States for economic protectionism. 6 After this challenge to the United States, Mexico became actively involved in
multilateral organizations representing the interests of developing
states.
Mexico's most significant foreign policy initiative in this regard was its promotion of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, which purported to organize and codify a "New
International Economic Order." The Charter was presented iniin Chile
in 1972. . and
tially
to* Uthe
third UNCTAD conference
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cally different international economic system. Billions of dollars
were to be transferred from developed states to developing countries via the United Nations. Further, significant changes in trade
relations between the two groups of states were to be made through
special agreements
and modifications of traditional trade
7
mechanisms.1

Of special interest to this discussion was the Charter's assertion
of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, which implied the
right of unrestricted nationalization of foreign enterprises according to national laws. Although most of the developed states abstained or voted against it, the Charter was approved by the UN
General Assembly in 1974.58 Differences regarding the national
sovereignty issue cleaved the developing countries and the industrialized states. The Charter, nevertheless, became Mexico's major
appeal to developing countries and a priority objective of its foreign policy. It added substance to Mexico's new diplomatic activisim at multilateral and bilateral levels and "proved to be its
main vehicle in establishing a respectable presence within the Third
World camp."'5 9
56. Y. SHAPIRO, MEXICAN FOREIGN POLICY UNDER ECHEVERRIA 46 (1978).
57. A comprehensive, up-to-date work on the New International Economic Order is K.
SAUVANT, CHANGING PRACTICES ON THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA:
TIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER

THE NEW INTERNA-

(1981); see also THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER:

CONFRONTATION OR COOPERATION BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH? (K.

Sauvant & H.

Hosenpflug eds. 1977).
58. G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
59. Y. SHAPIRO, supra note 50, at 59. Since 1974, Mexico has assumed some significant,
specific global roles. For example, in 1975, it chaired the Group of 77, and in 1982, it submitted on behalf of the Group of 77 a proposal dealing with remote sensing and international direct television broadcasting to the Second United Nations Conference on the
Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in Vienna. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 101/L.3
(1982). Additionally, in October of 1981, Mexico cohosted (with Canada) the International
Meeting on Cooperation and Development. The meeting was held in Cancun, Mexico. For
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B. Remote Sensing." Specific PoliticalConcerns
Although Mexico's colonial experience antedates similar experiences in most other developing countries, its present foreign
policy attitude and political culture were shaped, to a considerable
extent, by its struggles with Spain and the United States. Furthermore, the common history of conflict with and exploitation by more
powerful states best explains Mexico's alignment with the Third
World on international economic and political matters. Mexico's
standing as an advanced developing country has also encouraged
its leadership role. It is in this context that Mexico's attitude on the
legal issues relating to remote sensing and national sovereignty over
natural resources is best understood.
There is common concern among Third World states that the
activity of remote sensing may be used by the sensing states to exploit the sensed states. In general these states fear that exploitation,
characteristic of the colonial period of global history, will be reinstated-the net result being the exacerbation of the present unequal
economic and political relationships between developed and developing states. In particular, Mexico and other developing states oppose an open dissemination regime for remotely sensed data.
Specifically, Third World states believe that remote sensing of
natural resources, if uncontrolled, could adversely affect their economic progress and welfare. This is especially true since most
Third World states must depend upon economical programs for development of their natural resources. Although fact gathering is a
politically neutral activity, "earth resources satellites are often perceived as an economic threat, because of the satellite's potential for
providing economically useful data to other states."' 60 The Third
World perceives the release of this data as an invasion of privacy.
Interference with the normal and desired development of natural
resources could adversely affect a state because of the impact that
such information could have on international market conditions.
For example, if a particular state's economy is heavily dependent
upon the sale of a certain agricultural product on the world market,
"it is possible that world-wide knowledge of the existence of an
oversupply of that commodity would produce an undesirable effect
a detailed assessment of the Cancun meeting, see Mathews, World North-South Issues at the
Cancun Conference, in COMPARATIVE POLITICS 83/84, at 232-41 (Dushkin ed. 1982).
60. DeSaussure, supra note 13, at 714.
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on price."'6 1 Conversely, a desirable effect on prices would result if
the presence of an abnormally small supply were known.
Another specific concern is that information regarding the discovery of new minerals, including oil, might be used by a powerful
multinational enterprise to develop and control the new resources
to the detriment of the sensed state. Third World countries believe
that the large companies, which control natural resources and consumer goods, might use remotely sensed information to determine
their buying and selling policies and to extort development rights
by manipulating their control over mineral resources and energy.
V
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companies to stock up with huge quantities with a view to eventually raising prices. '"62

Mexico and other Third World states, which lack the technical
capacity and scientific infrastructure to develop an independent remote sensing program, feel isolated and potentially prejudiced by
the sensing programs which advanced states possess. They suspiciously regard such scientific and technical activities "as a means to
minimize" their efforts to control and manage their own destinies
"without excessive foreign influence."6 3 Not having remote sensing
capacities, they "fear they could be put at a disadvantage and that
others might exploit the technology to their detriment in ways
which might not be clearly foreseen.

C

64

Mexican- United States Relations

A review of Mexico's historic and present relations with the
United States adds a specific dimension to the characterization of
Mexico as an advanced developing country which possesses international economic and political interests similar to those of other
Third World states. Mexico's geographic contiguity to the United
States has been the dominant factor shaping Mexico's interests and
positions on foreign policy. This includes its legal position on remote sensing of natural resources. The economic exploitation of
Mexico occurred primarily at the hands of the United States, the
61. Pikus, Possibility of Technical Control over Resources by Remote Sensors, 16 PROC.
COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE 147 (1973).
62. Estrada, Detection ofEarth Resources by Remote Sensors, 15 PROC. COLLOQUIUM L.
OUTER SPACE 14 (1972).
63. Christol, supra note 13, at 135.
64. Wang, Canadaand the InternationalPrinciples GoverningRemote Sensing, in LEGAL
IMPLICATIONS OF REMOTE SENSING FROM OUTER SPACE 155 (N. Matte & H. DeSaussure
eds. 1976).
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leading sensing state. The intense feelings of nationalism and concern over national sovereignty, which largely motivate Mexico's
foreign policy, are clearly related to its sense of vulnerablity vis-Avis the United States.
Mexican feelings of apprehension toward its neighbor developed as long ago as the early nineteenth century. In 1823 the
United States issued the Monroe Doctrine, which seemed to offer
an alliance to Mexico should Spain seek to recapture her colonies.
Since it was promulgated unilaterally, however, the United States
alone determined the situations in which the Monroe Doctrine
would be applied. In time, the Monroe Doctrine was associated
with expansion and imperialism and became the implement for the
establishment of United States hegemony in Latin America. Mexicans have not forgotten their military encounters with the United
States. In the war of 1846-48, the United States occupied the Mexican capital city and seized and annexed roughly one-half of its territory. In 1914, the United States moved warships into Mexican
waters and occupied Vera Cruz. Americans also launched an invasion of Mexico in 1916 in order to punish Pancho Villa for his massacre of American mining engineers at Santa Ysabel, Mexico, and
for his raid on Columbus, New Mexico.6"
Mexico's economic dependence on the United States dates
from the 1880's and has increased over time.6 6 One of the objectives of Mexico's 1910 revolution was to rescue key sectors of its
economy from American and other foreign control. The revolution, therefore, was strongly nationalistic.
The Mexican Constitution of 1917 translated these nationalistic feelings into a legal framework. Of special importance is Article
27, which asserts national ownership of all subsoil wealth. Considerable confrontation with the United States developed over this
provision. After a bitter dispute erupted with American-owned oil
companies, Mexico implemented Article 27 in 1938 by nationalizing the industry. By that time, however, President Franklin
Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy had been inaugurated and was
strengthened by cooperation during World War II. MexicanUnited States cooperation continued after the war, although Mexico pursued an independent foreign policy sometimes at odds with
65. Ross, Aexican-U.S. Relations.- An HistoricalPerspective, in U.S.

POLICIES TOWARD

MEXICO: PERCEPTIONS AND PERSPECTIVES 6-8 (R. Erb & S. Ross eds. 1979).

66. Id. at 7.
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that of the United States. 67 At present, Article 27 remains one of
the most important symbols of nationalism, sovereignty and independence in Mexico's history.
During the presidency of Luis Echeverria (1970-76) differences
between the two countries again became especially sharp. As previously noted, this period marked the beginning of Mexico's active
pursuit of a leadership role in the Third World. Echeverria's successor, Lopez Portillo (1976-82), was somewhat more restrained in
his dealings with the United States. During his presidency, Mexico
presented a highly visible attack on the existing world order, but
projected a positive image toward foreign investment and discreetly
negotiated investment ties with the United States.6 8
At the economic level, however, several strains in MexicanUnited States relations developed. Mexico opposed the American
suggestion of a North American economic community and decided
in November 1980 to diversify its supply of oil products. 69 Of special importance was Mexico's 1980 decision not to become a signatory of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, although the
United States had been strongly urging membership. This act
probably had the most significant effect on the two states' economic
relations in recent years. The decision was largely a political one,
strongly nationalistic, and served to underscore the historical remembrances that have colored Mexican-United States relations.7"
The trade and investment dimension of Mexican-United States
relations further illustrates the tremendous influence of the United
States. One of the most important manifestations of Mexico's economic dependence is its financial dependence on foreign loans7 '
and direct foreign investment.7 2 In both cases, roughly seventy percent is of United States origin. Mexico has based its successful de67. Canada, Mexico, and the U.S.: New Tasks/or Good Neighbors, in GREAT DECISIONS 78, at 74 (Foreign Policy A., Inc. 1978).
68. Krasner, supra note 45, at 147.
69. Mexico's 1980 oil-export decision was not to sell more than fifty percent to any one
country; the United States had been purchasing eighty percent. Purcell, Mexico-United
States Relations. Big Initiatives Can Cause Big Problems, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 384 (1982).
70. Wichtrich, Mexican-American Commercial Relations, in MEXICO AND THE UNITED

STATES 88-89 (R. McBride ed. 1981).
7 1. A brief historic review of American loans to Mexico can be found in Del Rosario
Green, Mexico's Economic Dependency, in MEXICO-UNITED STATES RELATIONS 1 I 1-14 (S.
Purcell ed. 1981).
72. For a discussion of United States capital investment in Mexico, see Weinert, Foreign
Capital in Mexico, in MEXICO-UNITED STATES RELATIONS 115-24 (S. Purcell ed. 1981); see
also Wichtrich, supra note 64, at 92-103.
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velopment program largely on this capital. Foreign loans are more
limited in scope because lenders bring their capital and nothing
else. Investors, by contrast, supply management and technology in
addition to money, and thereby present a more visible challenge to
Mexico's sovereignty. Mexico's trade with the United States indicates a similar dominance. In 1980, Mexican exports to the United
States were sixty-eight percent of its total exports, and imports from
the United States were sixty-two percent of its total imports. Furthermore, in the last decade the dollar volume has so increased that
today Mexico is the United States' third largest trading partner.73
With the discovery of rich new oil fields74 and vast related
quantities of natural gas, Mexico may find its future trade and investment relationship with the United States less compelling than
before. To expand production substantially, however, vast sums of
foreign investment and loans-again most likely originating in the
United States-are required. The United States is obviously very
interested in a special trade relationship with Mexico where oil is
concerned. Mexico's economic situation, therefore, is somewhat
paradoxical. Although there is general mistrust of the United
States and an intense desire to exert nationalistic independence in
regard to its natural resources, Mexico must, nevertheless, rely
upon foreign capital and management resources, especially from
the United States, to finance its program of industrialization and
development.
III.

PROPOSAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR AN EGALITARIAN REMOTE
SENSING PROGRAM

If benefits are to result from remote sensing activities, states
must develop sufficient faith in others so that cooperation is possi73. Additional detailed statistics on trade between Mexico and the United States are
found in Wichtrich, supra note 64, at 80-87. See also Hufbauer, Bilateral Trade Relations, in
MEXICO-UNITED STATES RELATIONS, supra note 65, at 136-45; Randall, Mexcian Development and Its Effects upon United States Trade, in MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES, supra
note 64, at 49-76 for excellent accounts of Mexican-United States trade relations.
74. Mexico's total reserves of oil are estimated to be in excess of 60 billion barrels,
which is roughly six times the reserves of Alaska's North Slope and about forty percent of
Saudi Arabia's reserves. See Canada, Mexico, and the U.S.: New Tasks/or Good Neighbors,
supra note 61, at 74.
For an excellent discussion of the oil industry in Mexico, see Grayson, The Mexican Oil
Boom, in MEXICO-UNITED STATES RELATIONS, supra note 65, at 146-47.
For a very thorough account of the importance of oil in Mexican-United States relations, see generally U.S. MEXICAN ENERGY RELATIONSHIPS: REALITIES AND PROSPECTS (J.
Ladman, D. Baldwin & E. Bergman eds. 1981).
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ble. A state, therefore, should not oppose dissemination of remotely sensed information of its natural resources if that
information can be used, along with similar information on other
states, to benefit not only the sensed state but all of mankind. This
position parallels Third World thinking on the "Common Heritage
of Mankind" principle as it applies to both outer space and the
ocean floor.7 5 If it is logical, as the Common Heritage principle
asserts, that developing countries should receive an equitable share
of the resources and wealth of outer space and the ocean floor, it is
also logical philosophically to assume that natural resources elsewhere on earth shouia be usea for tme same purpose.
o argue
otherwise is to suggest that special consideration should be given to
developing countries, perhaps because of past exploitation and because, based on population, developed countries today consume a
disproportionate quantity of the natural resources of the world.
This latter argument is consistently made by Mexico and other
Third World states seeking an international economic order to replace the allegedly unfair existing system.
The industrialized states, however, have rejected the view that
economic woes of developing states are the result of the current
international economic system. Instead, they pinpoint present economic and development problems in the domestic systems of Third
World countries themselves. However, it can also be argued that
the contacts between developing countries and developed states,
both during and after colonization, have benefited rather than exploited the developing countries, leaving the poor better off economically and technologically than if no relationship had ever
75. For a discussion of the meaning and application of the Common Heritage of Mankind principle as it applies to the ocean, see Adede, The System for Exploitation of the 'Common Heritageof Mankind'at the Caracus Conference, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 31, 31-49 (1975); see
also Gorove, The Concept of 'Common Heritage of Mankind A Political,Moral, or Legal
Innovation?, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 390, 391-403 (1972).
Comments on the Common Heritage of Mankind as it applies to outer space are numerous. See Brooks, Prospectsfor Legal Progresson Celestial Bodies, 14 PROC. COLLOQUIUM L.
OUTER SPACE 181, 183 (1971); Christol, The Legal Common Heritage ofManking: Capturing
an Illusive Concept and Applying it to World Needs, 18 PROC. COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE
42,46 (1975); Cocca, The Principleof the 'Common Heritage of Mankind' as Applied to Natural
Resourcesfrom Outer Space and Celestial Bodies, 16 PROC. COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE
172-76 (1973); Dekanozov, Judicial Nature of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other
CelestialBodies, 17 PROC. COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE 200-07 (1974); Gorove, The Draft
Treaty Relating to the Moon. An Overview and Evaluation, 19 PROC. COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER

SPACE 41, 44 (1976); Kopal, Legal Questions Relating to the Draft Treaty of the Moon, 16
PROC. COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE 184 (1979).
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developed.7 6 To the extent this is true, there may be no basis in
fact, and certainly not in law, upon which to give special considerations to Third World states. Recalling that Mexican and Third
World demands for changes in the international economic system
would require the transfer of wealth from the developed to the developing states, it would thus seem appropriate to also ask developing countries to contribute to worldwide economic and social
betterment to the extent that knowledge of the location and identification of natural resources allows.
The Common Heritage principle involves both rich and poor
states. States are equal in the legal sense. It follows, therefore, that
Third World demands for a written, legal document to provide
special treatment regarding the benefits of remote sensing are not
really legal. Rather, they are political. In the international political
arena, where power rules, the interests of the less-powerful Third
World countries would be better served if they recognized their
limited influence and cooperated on a legally-based open dissemination program for remotely sensed data.
At any rate, it may be difficult at this point in remote sensing
activity to apply the 1981 Mexican Principles and to restrict the
present policy of open dissemination. This is particularly true because many of the existing data-receiving stations were created by
internationally viable agreements between the United States and
other states. It is difficult at best to legislate new international legal
rules where technology has advanced beyond the capability of
states to restrict it. Unless Mexico and other like-minded states alter their views somewhat, it is probable that remote sensing of natural resources by orbiting satellites will continue without specific
legal guidelines. The concerns and fears of states regarding possible economic exploitation, invasion of privacy, weakening of security, and infringement on sovereignty are understandable; however,
they are not sufficient to withhold remotely sensed information
from anyone if the greater needs of mankind can be met by open
dissemination. In any event, sensing states are unlikely to cease in
the participation of an activity which they feel is so benefical to
them and to the rest of the world.
76. For a strong argument which refutes traditional accounts of Third World exploitation by developed states, see generally P. BAUER, EQUALITY, THE THIRD WORLD AND EcoNOMIC DELUSION (1981).
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Assessments of the Mexican position on remote sensing of the
earth's natural resources by orbiting satellites have been made at
various points in this article, especially in connection with the specific legal issues involved. Legal discussions will not be reiterated
here, except to state that the 1981 Mexican Principles call for advance notification to the sensing state and prior approval before
remotely sensed data is disseminated to third parties. Further,
these attitudes are tied closely to Mexico's Third World membershin qnd itq hi.tonc re1ationm with the United States- It

is neces-

sary, however, to consider the soundness of the Mexican views in
the context of the global arena and general international interests.
Since no state denies to others national sovereignty over their
natural resources, it is relevant to ask how, if at all, the Mexican
requirements for advance notification and prior approval for dissemination in fact serve Mexico's best interests and those of the
other developing countries. It is presumed that remotely sensed
data in the possession of a party other than the sensed state might
be used for exploitation. For this to occur, however, the sensing
state either would not provide information to the sensed state at the
same time it was provided to third parties, or the sensing state
would provide no or incomplete information to the sensed state or
to third parties or to both. If these assumptions are correct, it follows logically that if all remotely sensed information were made
available to all interested parties, including, of course, the sensed
state, no country would be adversely affected. The only other explanation for a state to oppose open dissemination lies somewhere
in its domestic politics. The government in power, for whatever
reason, might not wish its own citizens or private industries to be
aware of new areas of natural resources. This would be an internal
matter, however, and not one that would engage international
political or legal considerations.
It is important to Third World states that they identify what
resources they have. Equal access to all remotely sensed data regarding their resources, therefore, is important. They will not want
it made available only to those few countries which operate satellites-the obvious result of a restrictive data-dissemination system.
This result would exacerbate the division between rich and poor
countries. Perhaps the only reliable way to protect states from being "comparatively disadvantaged or discriminated against is to insure that all states and all peoples have as much opportunity to
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obtain that data as does anyone else." 77 A restrictive data-dissemination system would seriously diminish progress around the world,
the consequences of which would most seriously affect Third World
states. 8
The United States, as the leading sensing state, has, since the
inception of remote sensing activities, followed an open policy of
making data available to all interested states, international organizations, individuals, scientific communities, and others on an equitable and timely basis. It has been the United States' position that
an open and widely used system of data dissemination would enhance the ability of states to manage and control the natural resources within their respective states and provide the world with
information which would allow better resource utilization. 79 Furthermore, the United States has negotiated numerous international
cooperative agreements with other states to share in data distribution and the technological aspects of remote sensing.8 ° Mexico is
one of these states.8 '
As noted initially, because remote sensing helps to identify and
locate new areas of natural resources, the technology can be used to
77. Stowe, supra note 25, at 420. Stowe also states that besides identifying natural resources, remote sensing satellites enable "land use analysis, mapping, water quality studies,
disaster relief, air and water pollution detection and analysis, protection and preservation of
the environment, and many others." Id. at 42 1. To consider only natural resources, is misleading, because all states, "[which include] especially developing countries, have broad and
sometimes urgent interests in all of these uses." Id. To refer only to data about resources, he
believes, is also technically unrealistic, "because the same data base which gives information
about resources gives information about all of these other uses.. . . To inhibit access to data
about one potential use is to inhibit data about all other uses . . . . There are no data from
these satellites which are pecufiar to or which can be restricted to Earth resources." Id.
78. It has been stated that "science and technology have a certain life of their own" and
that it is "exceedingly difficult to turn the clock back on scientific discovery and ethnological
applications. States rich in such science and technology seem compelled to assert both the
need and the right to use and perfect these living forces. Such is the vitality and durability of
the scientific-technological drive that it is quite possible that a given state would not be able
to slow it down or divert it to sterile ends, even if the state were so inclined to do so." Id.
Furthermore, when remote sensing is examined, "it is seen that through it nothing is being
done that is not being done in other ways-except that the other ways are slower, more
tedious, more cumbersome, less specific, generally more ineffective, and, considering the return, probably more expensive. Undoubtedly, it is too much to ask of mankind that conscious limits be placed on man's ability to gather information so that he may no longer
perceive the nature of his mysterious natural universe." Id.
79. Stowe, supra note 25, at 419-24.
80. For an explanation of United States policy and procedure regarding cooperation
with other States in remote sensing activities, see Hosenball, FreeAcquisition and Dissemination of Data through Remote Sensing, in LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF REMOTE SENSING FROM
OUTER SPACE 105 (N. Matte & H. DeSaussure eds. 1976).
81. Gorove, supra note 13, at 77.
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promote economic and social development around the world. The
goals of economic betterment and global political stability require
considerable cooperative effort. Remote sensing activities contribute to ,these objectives. Article I of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty
states that the "exploration and use" of outer space shall be "for the
benefit and in the interests of all countries." In negotiating this
agreement, states recognized that mankind had a common interest
in the uses to which outer space could be put. Remote sensing is an
example of how outer space can be used to deal with earthly
problems. An opposite interpretation, one that rejects the use of
space technoiogy such as remote sensing to aid in world crop estimates, location of mineral resources and similar uses, is difficult to

justify.
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